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Abstract
On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from Lashka-e-Toiba utilised military assault style tactics to attack a
number of establishments including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. This new attack paradigm
indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or deployment of suicide
bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement particularly with regard to intelligence,
response, and media management. There are few agencies currently geared to deal with the sheer scope of an event
involving trained terrorists well versed with small team tactics, heavily armed and equipped conducting operations
in any major city. This attack paradigm clearly presents unique challenges to police who will be tasked to respond to
these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that will be deployed against them.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) utilised military assault style
tactics to attack a number of establishments, including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. The name
of the group translates to Army of the Righteous, and it was formed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan in 1989
with a mandate to Islamise Indian administered Kashmir, and the wider region (Duraphe, 2009). This incident
resulted in the deaths of at least 172 people, and struck at the economic and social hub of India, thereby generating
significant media interest (Rabasa et al., 2009).
This attack paradigm indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or
deployment of suicide bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement (N.Y.P.D.
Intelligence Division, 2008). Globally there are few policing agencies currently geared to deal with an event of this
nature occurring in a major metropolitan city. According to Rabasa et al. (2009, p.1) this incident was significant due
to the sheer scale and complexity of the elements involved. This methodology clearly presents unique challenges to
police who will be the first to respond to these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that
will be deployed against them. This paper will not review the attack itself in detail, as both government and private
reports referenced have provided an excellent overview of the incident. This paper will focus on the emergent
challenges for policing organisations resulting from this incident.

EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST ATTACK PARADIGMS
Terrorist tactics have continually evolved from the 1970’s when groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine took hostages and made demands, generating media coverage for their cause. Information and
communications technology at the time required terrorist groups to undertake protracted operations in order to ensure
that their media and publicity objectives were met. Terrorists were dependent upon conventional media entities for
the achievement of such, a vulnerability that no longer exists in the contemporary networked world.
The events at the Munich Olympics in 1972 during which the terrorist group Black September took hostages,
resulted in a significant loss of life during an attempted rescue. This terrorist operation resulted in the creation of
specialised police and military hostage rescue units, culminating in the Iranian Embassy Siege in London famously
resolved 5 May, 1980 when the British 22 nd Special Air Service Regiment stormed the embassy and rescued the
hostages.
This paradigm whereby hostages are taken and the media utilised to articulate terrorist demands to a global audience
continued to determine the police response to terrorism. This was challenged with the emergence of the suicide
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bomber, as police were no longer afforded the opportunity to isolate the individual or group and negotiate a
resolution. Police are now confronted with individuals and groups who place devices either on their person or in situ,
then detonate them without making any demands. Islamist proponents like Abu Mus'ab al-Suri who advocate using
this approach posit that the greater the loss of life and atrocity committed, the greater the subsequent media coverage
(Lia, 2007). It could be argued that the transition from siege situations also corresponds with the increasing media
capability invested in the individual, who is now empowered by the evolving communications technology.
Suicide bombers or the placement of explosive devices by terrorists have targeted civilians in Bali, Madrid and
London. However, the direct attack method used in Mumbai may indicate yet another possible evolution in terrorist
tactics. It is clear that terrorist groups possess analytical capability and can adapt to tactics employed by law
enforcement. This is evidenced by the attempts to get chemical explosives onboard aircraft in component form,
rather than as an assembled unit in response to tightened aircraft security restrictions. Mumbai demonstrated the
continuing threat that exists when tactics from the battlefield are employed even more effectively against urban
targets, not located in the conflict zone. This brings them into direct conflict with patrolling police officers who are
not as well equipped and trained for this role, as the soldiers these tactics were designed to defeat.

ATTACK ON MUMBAI
The former city of Bombay, now known as Mumbai is the capital of the Indian state of Maharashta. It is one of the
most densely populated urban cities in the world with a population of approximately 20 million. It is a city of
contrasts from the eminently wealthy to the slums, founded on reclaimed land and still home to a commercial fishing
fleet, which is how those who attacked were able to navigate so close to the India coast unnoticed by security forces.
It was this accessibility from the sea in such close proximity to vast numbers of foreigners and India’s wealthy and
famous that sealed its’ selection by the terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2009). Mumbai had been attacked before in July
2006, when terrorists bombed a train and killed 209 people. The scope of the most recent attack reveals the potential
synthesis of terrorist attack profiles and presents significant challenges for all law enforcement agencies. Mumbai is
the commercial and entertainment epicentre of India, home to the world’s third largest stock exchange and the
Bollywood entertainment industry producing film and television programs (Rabasa et al., 2009). It was into this
vibrant mix of people and culture that ten armed terrorists entered on the night of 26 November, 2008 and
commenced multiple attacks against defenceless civilians, whom they deliberately and methodically murdered.
This assault style strategy was described by the New York City Police (2008, p.4) as, “a major shift in traditional
terrorist tactics”. This approach resulted in police being confronted with multiple active shooter locations. The term
‘active shooter’ is used in police and law enforcement agencies to describe a particular situation, whereby rapid
response to the incident and close containment of the offender are paramount. This required a shift in training and
deployment from the traditional incident cordon and contain approach, due to the propensity for the offender to
continue killing and seriously injuring those targeted until physically contained or prevented from doing so by
responding officers.
To address multiple active shooter locations, including large hotels containing thousands of people, required a large
scale well coordinated police response. The ability to deal with an incident like Mumbai would test the resources of
most contemporary policing organisations, and would require significant increases in planning, resourcing and
training to meet effectively. This requires intimate knowledge of potential targets that lie within the jurisdiction of
the relevant agency. Such a database needs to expand beyond the traditional critical infrastructure, like mass transit
points and power stations and water supplies. Policing agencies now need to compile data pertaining to hotels and
similar in order to ensure they are can regain the initiative at an incident. According to Rabasa et el. (2009, p.3) the
terrorists demonstrated intricate knowledge of the layout of the hotels and buildings. They utilised including areas
not normally accessed by the public, giving rise to the inference that the operation was meticulously planned. This
contrasts with the view posited by McElroy (2008) who cites an unnamed British official as highly critical of the
command and control and planning undertaken prior to the deployment of the India National Security Guards,
hostage rescue team. This negated their effectiveness as the terrorists were able to use service access facilities and
the Indian Commandos went in virtually blind.
The police in Mumbai were confronted with multiple incidents and were initially unable to ascertain the overall
picture. The attacks occurred over a 60 hour period and were reported widely on by the world’s media organisations.
In a report published by the RAND corporation Rabasa et al. (2009, p.3) acknowledge that the careful planning
undertaken prior to the Mumbai attacks. This was due to the complexity of the operation undertaken by the terrorists,
which challenged the resources of the responding police to contain them and protect the public. The challenge now
exists for policing organisations to ensure that operational practices continue to evolve to meet these types of threats,
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in order to anticipate and be prepared. Ganguly (2008) supports this and further advocates that changes are needed to
improve intelligence collection and the policing of large urban cities.

RESPONDING TO AN ACTIVE SHOOTER
Prior to the Columbine High School shooting in the United States in 1999, law enforcement would adhere to the
principle of isolate, cordon, contain and negotiate. The term ‘active shooter’ was coined following this event and is
now used to describe a law enforcement approach whereby initial responding officers seek to directly engage the
shooter, thereby denying them time to kill or harm further unarmed civilians (Pastor, 2010, p.136). The active
shooter approach whilst extremely high risk to the officers involved was not designed to meet the threat posed by an
attacking terrorist group. The emergent threat from Mumbai is that responding police may be confronted with
multiple trained active shooters who are better armed and operating with the sole aim of inflicting maximum
casualties on the civilian population.
Criminal activities including the Bank of America shootout in Los Angeles in 1997 where Los Angeles Police
(LAPD) officers were confronted by heavily armed offenders following a bank robbery illustrate the scope of the
challenge. The responding officers were only armed with 9mm handguns and 12 gauge shotguns against criminals
with fully automatic .308 calibre (7.62mm) assault rifles and full body armour, which defeated most of the police
rounds fired. This situation resulted in changes to LAPD policy and AR-15 rifles are now carried by most patrol
vehicles to ensure that officers have the capability to protect themselves and the public should a similar event occur.
The fear and uncertainty created during the hunt for the Washington sniper in 2002 and media frenzy during the
event showcased the pressure that law enforcement agencies operate under during major incidents. The loss of ten
lives and the fear generated in the community as citizens were murdered going about their normal daily business
created uncertainty and distrust. Whilst neither of these events were perpetrated in the name of a terrorist group they
still reveal the challenges facing law enforcement from criminals most of whom will seek to escape where possible.
Unless the responding officers are trained and equipped appropriately it is highly likely that they will be unable to
protect themselves or the community. Reliance upon a police tactical team even in those jurisdictions where police
are armed can only be effective if that capability can respond to multiple threats within a very short time. The LAPD
experience illustrated the difficulties facing patrol officers armed with handguns when confronting criminals who are
armed with high powered assault rifles. The ability for LAPD patrol officers to effectively contain such a threat is
now provided by the semi automatic rifles carried in each patrol vehicle. This enables those officers initially
responding to establish a cordon, and in circumstances of imminent jeopardy to take action and limit the loss of
civilian lives.
Terrorist groups operating like those in Mumbai go beyond the threat posed by heavily armed criminals and can
overwhelm traditional police responses. Rabasa et al. (2009, p.6) cite testimony from the surviving terrorist to
illustrate that his mission was to kill as many people as possible. This approach means that until actually stopped by
police the terrorist will continue killing. This threat is now realised even by those jurisdictions where the police are
not traditionally armed, and instead are reliant upon a small cadre of highly trained officers to provide specialist
firearms response akin to the UK model.
However, the threat posed by the Mumbai experience has caused the UK to review policy and upgrade the capability
and amount of ammunition carried by armed officers, in order to allow them to effectively confront the threat.
Former UK Security Minister Lord West is quoted by the Gardner (2010) as saying:
These people like the Mumbai terrorists, are a bit like soldiers, they do fire and support, move
forward, all they want to do is kill as many as possible, with slightly heavier weapons than our police
have and therefore you have to give heavy weapons to the police and train them how to do it.
Lord West succinctly describes the challenge facing police who will be the first to respond to such an incident.
Rabasa et al. (2009, pp., 4-5) identify the assault rifles carried by the terrorists in Mumbai as AK-56 a Chinese
variant of the ubiquitous Russian Ak-47. This was used in combination with improvised explosive devices and hand
grenades to create a situation whereby police commanders were unable to discern the overall picture of what they
were facing, thereby negating their ability to plan and deploy appropriately. According to Ganguly (2008) the Indian
government were unprepared to deal with an incident like Mumbai and took nine hours to deploy the National
Security Guards to the scene in order to engage the terrorists.
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According to Page (2008) the state of the equipment issued to the police in Mumbai helped to explain why ten
terrorists managed to exert influence over a city of nearly 18 million people for more than sixty hours. Page (2008)
supports this assertion quoting Maxwell Pereira a former Dehli joint police commissioner who commented on the
state of police resources, “These casualties could have been prevented if they’d been properly equipped”.

MEDIA MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
Policing organisations utilise the media to convey messages to the public and detail response to incidents of public
interest. As such the public image of these agencies can be adversely affected, when media entities take a particular
denunciatory frame regarding police activities. This approach can reduce public confidence and limit the flow of
information coming into the police. In order to address this most police agencies now have media units staffed by
former journalists and experienced advisors. This has resulted in a very open approach, whereby police actively
engage the media and this strategy is effective with regard to most traditional crime types. However, such an
approach is inherently problematic when this template is applied to terrorist incidents like Mumbai. Live feeds and
reports from incident scenes where police commanders answer operational questions that refer to timeframes, future
intentions, and deployment or response strategies now have the potential to provide terrorists with advanced warning
and allow them to alter their tactics in response.
This was identified by McElroy (2008) who asserts that an Indian cabinet minister publically announced the
timeframe for deployment of commandos to the incident scene, information that was of significant value to the
terrorists. This will require police organisations to develop new media strategies and train their staff and
management accordingly. Such an approach will need to be undertaken in close partnership with government, to
ensure that the political response is cognisant of the challenges involved.
Relationships with the conventional media have historically presented policing agencies with challenges and
opportunities during major incidents. However, in addition to the challenges posed by the events themselves, law
enforcement is now confronted with terrorists who are accessing real time intelligence data regarding the police
response and deployment via the media. The 24/7 news cycle generates intense competition between media entities
and can adversely affect responsible reporting. The excessive competition between Indian media agencies is seen by
Acharya, et al. (2008, p.42) to have resulted in behaviour that was focused on the business of news rather than the
responsbile delivery of information to the community. This focus on the measures undertaken by the Indian
authorities provided a wealth of information to the terrorists and also informed them about those they held hostage.
Most media entities now stream live video and photographs from incident scenes via the Internet enabling anyone
with a connection to remotely access the data stream. This facilitates real time analysis from a location removed from
the incident site resulting in the provision of actionable intelligence to the terrorists themselves. It can be inferred
from the situation in Mumbai and ongoing communications between team members, and their base in Pakistan that
intelligence was been fed back to the team whilst they were still carrying out attacks, thereby enabling them to negate
the effectiveness of responding police (N.Y.P.D. Intelligence Division, 2008, p.5).
Mumbai clearly illustrated that contemporary policing agencies need to be aware of the operational space that they
now operate within. This space makes use of ubiquitous communications technology, allowing those involved to
change their tactics in response to police deployment. Advances in social networking technology are creating an
environment where video from an incident can be uploaded in real time. Social media and networks like You Tube,
Facebook and Twitter allow the uploading of photos and video with the potential for anyone to access. This can
readily identify police tactics like those in Mumbai when commandos began fast-roping onto the roof of the hotels.
Whilst the terrorists could not physically see what the commandos were doing, the media coverage provided their
controllers with a live feed of the incident. This allowed the terrorists to identify the likely approach routes of the
commandos based upon their physical entry points the building and respond accordingly. The intercepted phone calls
between the terrorists in Mumbai and their controllers in Pakistan clearly detailed the assessment of the tactics being
used against them and directed a response. One intercept released by the Indian Government (2008, p.54) detailed
instructions passed to the terrorists:
Keep in mind that the hostages are of use only as long as you do not come under fire because of their
safety. If you are still threatened, then don’t saddle yourself with the burden of the hostages,
immediately kill them.
This view is also supported by Rabasa et al. (2009, p.7) who posits that the terrorists received tactical advice based
upon what their handlers were able to discern and analyse from the live media feeds at the scene. During a protracted
incident like Mumbai police commanders will need to gain an effective picture of the overall incident. According to
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Acharya, Mendal, & Mehta, (2008, p.6) the planning of the Mumbai attack was designed to create confusion and
negate any effective response by Indian authorities. Following the Mumbai attacks the NYPD deployed members to
the scene to liaise with Indian investigators and provide intelligence that the NYPD could use to plan its response to
a similar incident in New York City. According to information obtained by the NYPD Intelligence Division (2008,
p.42) the terrorists involved made excellent use of information and communications technology:
They carried blackberries, compact disks with high-resolution satellite images such as Google Earth
maps, and had multiple cell phones with interchangeable SIM cards that would be hard to track.
Once on the scene they removed cell phones from hostages and used them to stay in contact with one
another.
This use of multiple cell phones and Internet access technology would require significant resources to intercept,
translate and analyse. It would however, present a unique opportunity to intercept communications and discern future
intention.

INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS
In order for a terrorist or extremist group to mount a similar attack to that staged in Mumbai they would need access
to the requisite weaponry and the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies (Binnie & LeMiere, 2008). It
could be argued that such a group would also need to operate below the law enforcement radar, unless such and
attack was to be funded by crime. Changes in society are necessitating new paradigms for the collection and analysis
of intelligence needed to support national security operations, and guide public policy (Sullivan, 2008). Predictive
analysis or warning intelligence is needed to allow policing agencies to take action prior to a terrorist incident.
However, the production of this class of intelligence is inherently difficult. It requires engagement with policy
makers in order for the assessment and discussion of differing hypotheses regarding emergent challenges, prior to
determining policy responses. This engagement will facilitate a broader strategic approach, rather than the prevailing
policy of demands for immediate intelligence (Sullivan, 2008).
Traditional intelligence practices from the Cold War are not well suited to meeting the challenges posed by the
dynamic nature of contemporary terrorism. This new environment contains a manifold of non-state actors, cultures
and political objectives fed by an extremist ideology, that is spread via new communications technologies (United
States Government, 2006). Accordingly, it could be argued that no organisation is better suited to enhancing
domestic intelligence capabilities than local policing agencies. Intricate knowledge of local communities, offenders,
crime types and patterns of behaviour make local police highly attuned to the environment they patrol. However,
such agencies are limited in their ability to isolate and dedicate resources solely for counter-terrorism due to fiscal
and resource constraints, thus limiting their ability to focus purely on intelligence (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, &
Davis, 2005).
Evans (2005) posits that whilst intelligence should be the primary strategic consideration for addressing terrorism, it
can only be effective if delivered in such a manner as to meet the needs of its customers. In order for intelligence to
be advantageous, the organisation producing it must have the capacity to discern the challenges that the future may
hold. Such intelligence, when provided to policy makers, has the capacity to improve their decision making process,
resulting in the initiation of action that is more likely succeed. It is this ability to take action as a result of an
intelligence product relevant to the particular situation, that is the ultimate outcome for the intelligence community
(United States Government, 2008).
In order to remain effective in the future the producers of analytical intelligence products, including the police, will
need to understand and anticipate the needs of those who use them. This will necessitate a shift from the production
of a traditional list of intelligence requirements to a more mission orientated focus designed to assist decision makers
in achieving objectives (United States Government, 2008). Quiggin (2007, p.50) defines this as, “The final all-source
intelligence product of actionable knowledge provided to government to anticipate or reduce uncertainty in its
pursuit or protection of international political, economic and security objectives”.
The primary task of the contemporary intelligence agency is the provision of quality analytical product to decision
makers. However, its production is reliant upon the human cognitive element, which is often overlooked as attention
and subsequent funding is drawn to the impressive technical hardware that intelligence agencies can deploy (Wastell,
Clark, & Duncan, 2006). Technical collection systems like satellites, which can demonstrate a clear capability and
are supported by excellent marketing, will normally always be funded as a priority. However, Treverton (cited in
Quiggin, 2007, p.92) argues that more resources should be provided to analysis in order to increase the processing
capability as funding for such is deficient in most policing agencies. This results in a failure to recruit, train and
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mentor high quality analysts, which Zegart (2007) posits was the case for FBI intelligence analysts prior to 9/11, but
has now improved due to the FBI integrating intelligence into its core mission.
It is this human element, which technology cannot replicate that is so crucial to successfully discerning key
information. The intelligence community has also identified significant challenges posed by the need to recruit, train
and retain the best and brightest in the current employment market. Conditions and remuneration will need to be
adjusted in line with the private sector to ensure they remain a competitive employer (United States Government,
2008). Once trained these analysts may be able to recognise key fragments of intelligence termed indicators.
Discernable indicators or warnings may be produced at any time in the terrorist ‘Event Horizon’ as discussed by
Sullivan & Wirtz (2008, p.18) who classify this as the time between the conception and execution of a terrorist
operation. This will necessitate analysts being able to indentify targets and modes of attack and information about
those involved from just about any point along the ‘Event Horizon’ where the indicator is first recognised.
Whilst conventional military operations take time to build up and deploy assets thereby providing discernible
indicators, the activities of terrorists are more subtle and harder to predict. Whilst not advocating that the future can
be successfully predicated, Quiggin acknowledges that the role of intelligence is to scan the horizon, and provide
warning about future challenges in such a manner as to allow decisions to be made and action taken. According to
Robert Bowie a former deputy director of the CIA actionable intelligence is, “knowledge and analysis designed to
assist action” (May, 1984, p.3). Whilst structural and bureaucratic change occurs across police and intelligence
agencies, it is the ability of these agencies to successfully adapt at a sufficient rate to meet the shifting global
challenges that is essential (Zegart, 2007). Cultural impediments can significantly hamper efforts to adapt.
Individuals within the organisation can becoming institutionalised and insist on doing things a particular was because
that’s the way they have always been done, thereby ensuring that newer members adhere to this mantra (Zegart,
2007). This can be alleviated over time by targeted recruitment practices in order to ensure that the intelligence team
is sufficiently diverse, and contains a range of highly skilled members who are not afraid to question the status quo
and challenge unsubstantiated opinion (Quiggin, 2007).
Counter-terrorism analysts require an intricate understanding of the environment, which facilitates such activity, and
may need to become experts regarding specific groups or geographic regions. Such levels of competency will take
years to acquire, and cannot be taught in a short course (Best, 2003). Therefore the retention of such skills is essential
if intelligence organisations are to be able to achieve their mission. Cooper (2005) identifies that analytical success
cannot be achieved by the wishes of senior command or the issuance of instructions, it can only be achieved by the
correct selection, training and mentoring of the individuals who are assigned to that role. Intelligence agencies need
to be able to acknowledge their limitations and decline requests when necessary, or else run the risk of overloading
their analytical workforce thereby reducing the quality of the product (Cooper, 2005).
Problems can emerge when analysts are not provided with access to data from other agencies. This can be caused by
IT systems that cannot communicate or restrictions placed on the sharing of information by particular agency to
protect sources. If it is not able to be accessed and aggregated into the final product, then critical decisions are being
made with incomplete information (Cooper, 2005). The culture of competitive analysis in which intelligence is
examined in isolation without input from other agencies has also impaired the ability of the wider intelligence
community to address the current challenges (AFCEA Intelligence Committee, 2005).
Harris (2004) advocates team based analytical gaming and scenario based approaches to analysis. The ability for
intelligence agencies to deploy small teams of specialists against a dynamic networked adversary could prove pivotal
in the current threat environment. There is an identified need to encourage personal initiative and lateral thinking,
thereby ensuring that the resultant analytical product is not tailored to reflect the cultural biases or beliefs inherent in
the particular group or organisation (Harris, 2004). According to Sullivan & Wirtz (2008) the military model of
intelligence preparation of the battlefield can be adapted for law enforcement use, resulting in a new approach termed
intelligence preparation for operations (IPO). This approach consists of a four-step process including situational
recognition, analysis, divining course of action and rehearsals. This model is also designed to bridge the divide
between deliberate and emergency response planning as it provides multiple scenarios, thereby allowing
commanders to work up a variety of responses and assess the suitability of each. Senior commanders or government
officials need sufficient lead time to allow the decisions they make to be effectively implemented. This lead time is
dependent upon the direction given to the intelligence unit to conduct strategic assessment, otherwise the decision
making process will be directed to an extent by the unforseen crisis (Quiggin, 2007).
Whilst the term intelligence can be applied to almost any context, Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) advocates its
application to the national security arena pertaining to the activities that are of interest to national governments.
Quiggin (2007) posits that intelligence is better described as a craft, rather than a scientific endeavour. Such
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explanation places intelligence into a domain whereby skills are learnt under guidance from an experienced
practitioner, until sufficiently developed to the level whereby the individual can defensibly state their position based
upon credible analysis. The future will require intelligence analysts who are globally aware and capable of
understanding the potential domestic effects of events occurring well beyond their geographical or jurisdictional
borders. This is particularly pertinent for policing agencies as analysts who can project beyond the immediate
operational sphere into the strategic realm are an extremely rare commodity. Continual rotation of staff is an ongoing
issue in many government agencies, and prevents the development of knowledge and experience required to
effectively counter emergent threats. This expertise can’t be replicated by technology, which is just a tool to be used
by the analyst to enhance their capabilities.
Quiggin (2007) adopts the position that unless a paradigm shift occurs the future for intelligence analysis is not a
positive one. He bases this on a lack of parity between the analysts and technical collection resources in terms of
funding as well as an adoption of the military approach, which is not always suited to domestic missions. This
outlook is further compounded by the culture of secrecy, difficulty in accessing classified material (stove-piping),
and finally a lack of ongoing training resulting from culture that is unwilling to change. This lack of training is
highlighted numerous times by Quiggin (2007) and whilst a contributing factor to intelligence failures, it is seldom
identified as a such in subsequent inquires. Whilst it is acknowledged by Grabo (2004), Kam (2004) and Khalsa
(2004) that there are challenges in identifying relevant data, all are of the view that it is achievable if a sound
methodology is followed and historical lessons noted. However, all acknowledge the difficulties that the current
terrorist threat presents. When attempting to evaluate and identify potential data the, “ability to perceive or attempt to
perceive what others are thinking” (Grabo, 2004, p.47) is critically important.
Viewing the potential event from the terrorist perspective can allow the analyst to identify the critical points along
the event horizon that could provide intelligence about a pending attack. The approach taken to collecting data needs
to be able to highly flexible in order to meet the dynamic nature of the threat posed by extremists. Traditional strict
hierarchal structures, working routines and methodologies may not keep pace with technology and therefore may
prove ineffective (Clark, 2004, p.160). The difficulties faced when endeavouring to produce intelligence assessments
in times of stable international relations are significant but as Quiggin (2007, p.95) identifies they are magnified
when attempting to produce, “accurate assessments on multiple targets in a fast changing fluid and violent
environment”. However Zegart (2007) is of the opinion that the lack of another attack on U.S. soils since 9/11 is not
attributable to an increase in the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.

CONCLUSION
The ability to acquire real time intelligence from the media during a terrorist incident by those involved poses
significant challenges for police responding to and managing the incident. This will extend to the physical access
allowed to the media who may have greater assets that the police at the incident scene and the information that is
provided to the media. This combined with the sheer scope of the challenge of managing multiple crime scenes and
confronting unknown offenders also requires training and preparation. It is this training in high stress situations that
needs to go beyond that traditionally practiced, and introduce simultaneous and seamless interaction by those at the
tactical and strategic levels who are able provided with actionable intelligence product. This will require a new
paradigm of policing response to address including the appropriate resourcing of equipment and training. Rabasa et
al. (2009, p.10) support this asserting that in order for responding police to be effective they need to have the
equipment and training necessary to allow them to engage or contain the terrorists. Such deployments will need to be
supported by a 24/7 intelligence capability.
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